Justin and MaGee - Colonial Americans » Phillip Alonzo Chaffee , Private USA (1826-1906)

Persoonlijke gegevens Phillip Alonzo Chaffee , Private USA 

• Hij is geboren op 22 februari 1826 in Frankfort, Herkimer County, New York.Bronnen 2, 5, 6, 7
• Woonachtig:
• Michigan, Verenigde Staten.Bron 4
• in het jaar 1900: St Clair Township (Excl. St Clair City), St. Clair, Michigan.Bron 6
• St Clair, Michigan.Bron 3
• in het jaar 1880: Saint Clair, Saint Clair, Michigan, United States.Bron 7
• in het jaar 1910: Grand Rapids, Kent, Michigan.Bron 2
• in het jaar 1900: Allegan Village, Allegan, Michigan.Bron 8
• in het jaar 1880: Allegan, Allegan, Michigan, United States.Bron 9
• in het jaar 1860: Allegan, Allegan, Michigan.Bron 5
• in het jaar 1827: Mohawk Valley, New York.
• (Military Service ) in het jaar 1861 in Civil War: PrivateBattery "H", 1st Michigan Light Artillery.
• Hij is overleden in het jaar 1906 in St. Clair, St. Clair County, Michigan, hij was toen 79 jaar oud.
• Hij is begraven in Bowman Cemetery, St. Clair Township, St. Clair County, Michigan.
• Een kind van Alpha Chaffee en Elfie (Effie) Kelch

Gezin van Phillip Alonzo Chaffee , Private USA

(1) Hij is getrouwd met Lucinda C. Storms.

Zij zijn getrouwd op 16 januari 1850 te St. Clair County, Michigan, hij was toen 23 jaar oud.

Kind(eren):

1. Laurentine Chaffee  1854-1870

(2) Hij is getrouwd met Ameila Chaffie.

Zij zijn getrouwd in het jaar 1896, hij was toen 69 jaar oud.Bron 6

Notities over Phillip Alonzo Chaffee , Private USA

LDS IGI St Clair County marraiges 183801864

Served in Battery "H" (“DeGolyer’s battery 8TH MI) 1st Michigan Light Artillary along with 2 brothers and 11 Cousins.

Pages 145-1field. In his “After Action Report” of the Battle of Raymond, Union Major General James B. McPherson wrote, “About 11 a.m., and when within 2 miles of Raymond, we came upon the enemy, under the command of General Gregg, and 4,000 or 5,000 strong, judiciously posted, with two batteries of artillery so placed as to sweep the road and a bridge over which it was necessary to pass.” The Confederate artillerymen must have been really working hard to gain the attention of the young Yankee general, for he over-estimated the three Rebel cannon to be “two batteries,” or six guns. Up closer to the front, Union Major General John Logan recorded the artillery action with a bit more detail, writing that, “DeGolyer’s battery [8TH MI] was placed in a position in the road near the bridge, and the whole line ordered to advance into a piece of the timber . . . DeGolyer’s battery, which at first was in position on the road, having been moved into an open field on their left, played on their flanks during the retreat with terrible effect. One attempt of the enemy to charge and capture the battery was met by such a terrific fire of grape and canister that they broke and fled from the field.” Finally, on the front line, Henry Dwight of the 20th Ohio saw the action as only a foot soldier could, saying, “DeGolyer’s battery was watering its horses so near to the skirmish line that if the infantry was driven back an inch, it would be captured by the swarming rebels long before help could be got from our other brigades . . . DeGolyer’s battery of artillery, which always marched with us, stopped in the road near the skirmish line, and two of the guns were pointed down the road, in case any inquisitive chap should be coming from the other direction to see what we were about . . .” The Confederates certainly noticed the artillery, as Confederate Colonel Hiram Granbury, commanding the 7th Texas Infantry, vividly remembered, “In the mean time, the enemy had a battery in position about 600 yards in advance of our position, and opened fire on Captain [H. M.] Bledsoe’s battery, then being planted in the field, on the right of the road and little to the rear of my position. Private [D.] Kennedy, of Company H, was wounded in the leg by a shrapnel from the enemy’s battery.” Just as the soldiers of both sides remembered the artillery at the Battle of Raymond, the Friends of Raymond intend to honor those soldiers and their accounts. Fortuitously, in 2003 the Vicksburg National Military Park replaced 40 of their almost 100-year-old cast iron replica cannon carriages (the original Civil War carriages were made mostly of wood) in the military park with new aluminum carriages. Of course, the irreplaceable original cannon barrels remained in Vicksburg, but the Friends of Raymond was invited to take the old carriages and wheels to Raymond for use on that battlefield. Consequently, President Dick Kilby, vice-president Parker Hills and board member Alan Polk traveled to Vicksburg on October 17 and again on November 21 to pick up the tons of cast iron carriages and wheels that will be the basis for the future artillery display at the Raymond battlefield. Board member John Barber lent a hand, and the work was completed just at dusk on a chilly Friday afternoon in November. The cannon carriages and wheels need work, and the Friends are in search of a member who can weld cast iron and can donate some time. The carriages will then be sanded, painted, and reassembled on the battlefield. Meanwhile, the Friends will search for cannon barrels and methods to fund these barrels. In the end, however, the Raymond Battlefield will honor its artillery heritage. The guns may not boom as they did on that spring day in 1863, but they will stand as silent sentinels of the action there. Visitors to the future Raymond Battlefield will then remember, as did the soldiers who fought at Fourteenmile Creek.

Battlefield Detectives: The Cannon at RaymondbyParker Hills

The battlefield at Raymond, Mississippi, is being preserved by Friends of Raymond one acre at a time, beginning with a 40-acre purchase in the mid-1990s. Thus, interpretation of this battlefield, unlike that of many of our nation’s national parks established at the turn of the 19th and 20th Centuries, is without benefit of the living testimony of veterans. Unit locations and maneuvers must be gleaned from written accounts, which are rarely detailed to the degree desired by a battlefield historian. The same applies to the long arm-the artillery on the field. Where were the guns, and what type were they?
On the 12th day of May, 1863, twenty-two Union and three Confederate cannon blasted their iron missiles across the Southern cornfields during the Battle of Raymond. Surprisingly, little has been written on the type and location of these artillery pieces. Until recently, a commanding ridge approximately 1,350 yards [.76 mile] from the Fourteenmile Creek Bridge was known as “Artillery Ridge” and was interpreted as the position of the twenty-two U.S. cannon. Today, this ridge has been more appropriately named “McPherson Ridge.” This ridge is 1,250 yards (.7 mile) south of Fourteenmile Creek, a meandering stream which crosses the battlefield from northwest to southeast, and 4,400 yards (2.5 miles, straight line distance) from the City of Raymond’s town square. From this ridge, Union Major General James Birdseye McPherson observed the Battle of Raymond, but, despite former interpretation, no cannon were fired from this dominant but distant position. The ranges were just too great.
So, if the Union cannon were not on McPherson Ridge, where were they? There is another, almost imperceptible, ridge approximately 400 yards (.2 mile) south of Fourteenmile Creek at Hwy 18. Today, this slight rise over the floodplain of the creek is known as “Artillery Ridge,” and is 3,600 yards (2 miles) from Raymond. It was here that the Union artillery finally went into battery. How was this determined? The written records had to be carefully analyzed.
Major General John A. Logan, Commanding the 3rd Division, McPherson’s XVII Corps, reported:At the commencement of the engagement, DeGolyer’s (Eighth Michigan) battery was placed in position on each side of the main road and near a bridge across a ravine in which the infantry of the enemy was posted, and immediately engaged the enemy’s artillery, which was posted on rising ground about 800 yards distant. After remaining in this position about an hour, this battery was removed, and placed in a new position on the left of the Second Brigade or extreme left of the division.”
Division commander John Logan’s corps commander, Major General James McPherson, reported:About 11 a.m., and when within 2 miles of Raymond, we came upon the enemy, under the command of General Gregg, and 4,000 or 5,000 strong, judiciously posted, with two batteries of artillery so placed as to sweep the road and a bridge over which it was necessary to pass. DeGolyer’s battery [8TH MI] was placed in a position in the road near the bridge, and the whole line ordered to advance into a piece of the timber . . . General Logan’s account agrees with General McPherson’s in the placement of DeGolyer’s 8th Michigan battery near the wooden Fourteenmile Creek bridge, which stood on the site of the circa 1910 concrete bridge on property now belonging to the Friends of Raymond. To further pinpoint the initial position of DeGolyer’s guns, one must measure 800 yards to the north, where the Confederate artillery was posted, at least according to General Logan. So, did John Logan have a good eye for distance?
Thee is no mystery as to the location of the Southern guns, because Confederate General John Gregg’s description of the emplacement of the three Confederate artillery pieces on the Raymond battlefield is clear, based upon a recognizable landmark (a road junction, which still exists today), and these artillery pieces remained stationary throughout the fight. Gregg wrote:
I placed Captain [H. M.] Bledsoe, with his three pieces of artillery, on the road leading to Utica and Port Gibson, near their junction, directing him to select the most commanding position. The Confederate artillery position is almost exactly 800 yards north of the old Fourteenmile Creek bridge. Thus, DeGolyer must have placed his guns close to the bridge, as attested to by General Logan, who apparently gauged range with accuracy. The close proximity of DeGolyer’s Union cannon to the creek is attested to by the account of Henry Dwight of the 20th Ohio Infantry: DeGolyer’s battery was watering its horses so near to the skirmish line that if the infantry was driven back an inch, it would be captured by the swarming rebels long before help could be got from our other brigades. DeGolyer’s battery of artillery, which always marched with us, stopped in the road near the skirmish line, and two of the guns were pointed down the road, in case any inquisitive chap should be coming from the other direction to see what we were about.
Remarkably, we have the good fortune to have a visual record of DeGolyer’s position, because Theodore R. Davis, a New York newspaper reporter and artist, made at least one sketch and two finished drawings of DeGolyer’s position. The first drawing depicts the left of DeGolyer’s Battery at the Fourteenmile Creek bridge, and the wooden bridge can be clearly seen in the center of the picture. DeGolyer’s Union battery did not stay near the Fourteenmile Creek bridge for long. General McPherson continued his description of the position of the young captain’s guns:
DeGolyer’s battery, which at first was in position on the road, having been moved into an open field on their left, played on their flanks during the retreat with terrible effect. One attempt of the enemy to charge and capture the battery was met by such a terrific fire of grape and canister that they broke and fled from the field.
Henry Dwight of the 20th Ohio described DeGolyer’s retrograde:
The Johnnies sent in another regiment on our left to pick up DeGolyer’s battery, as a kind of past time like. But the battery had given back a little for the sake of a better ground and when the Johnnies tried to go there they got the fire of the 78th and 68th [Ohio] besides as much canister as they could digest for one while. So, they concluded they would not take DeGolyer just then.
DeGolyer’s Battery fell “back a little” according to Dwight, into “an open field on their left,” according to McPherson.
As the Union troops moved northward up the road toward Fourteenmile Creek, Colonel Samuel Holmes, Commander of the 2nd Brigade of Marcellus Crocker’s 7th Division, McPherson’s XVII Corps, described the position of the Federal artillery.
May 12, we advance 7 miles toward Raymond, near which place we found Major-General Logan’s division severely engaged with the enemy. The brigade, by direction of Brigadier-General Crocker, was at once formed in support of several batteries found in position on the left of the road, but not engaged.
George Woodruff, Battery D, 1st Illinois Light Artillery, recalled:
…on the morning of the 12th our forces came up with the enemy, three miles south west of Raymond, and 19 miles from Jackson. Gen. Logan’s division was in the advance. Battery D was in 2nd brigade and center division, DeGolyer’s being in the 1st, and in the lead. In the early part of the day DeGolyer got into a sharp duel with a battery of the enemy . . . Now came the time for the old McAllister Battery to take a hand. It was brought to the front into position with our old 20th [Illinois Infantry], and the 45th [Illinois Infantry] for its support. The enemy’s position was on the brow of the hill, across an open field 1300 or 1400 yards distant, where they had a battery with infantry support. The range was a long one for the guns of Battery D, and the enemy’s guns being rifled, the odds were against our boys, but they pitched in with a will, and soon managed to dismount one of the enemy’s pieces, and set the infantry flying . . . Battery D fired 72 rounds, and all the boys acted nobly.
Woodruff, an artilleryman who gave the range at 1,300 or 1,400 yards, was quite accurate at estimating yardage. He mentions the range as “a long one for the guns of Battery D,” which were 24-pound howitzers. Considering that the maximum effective range of a 24-pounder howitzer was 1,322 yards, this, too, was an accurate statement. The distance from the known Confederate artillery position to “Artillery Ridge” is 1,350 yards. Woodruff’s ranges place the 1st Illinois on “Artillery Ridge,” either on the Utica road or near it, for the range increases from the Confederate artillery position as one travels to the west along “Artillery Ridge.”
Major Francis Deimling, Commander of the 10th Missouri Regiment, 2d Brigade, Crocker’s 7th Division, McPherson’s XVII Corps, reported:
May 12, at 7 a.m., marched about 7 miles toward Raymond. When within 2 miles of the town went into position on the left side of the road, in support of the Eleventh Ohio Battery, which was posted on a ridge about 50 yards to the front.
Major Deimling places the 11th Ohio battery to the left of the road on a ridge within two miles of Raymond. “Artillery Ridge” is almost exactly two miles from Raymond.
General John A. Logan continued to describe the action in his report, and places the Third Ohio battery on the left flank:
Captain Williams’ (Third Ohio) battery was ordered to a position on the left flank, but was only slightly engaged. He was placed in that position to prevent any flank movement which the enemy might contemplate in that direction.
So, from the above accounts the Union artillery batteries (DeGolyer’s 8th Battery, Michigan Light Artillery; Company D, 1st Illinois Light Artillery; 3rd Battery, Ohio Light Artillery; and 11th Battery, Ohio Light Artillery) can be positioned, after DeGolyer’s retrograde to the open field at the left, at Artillery Ridge, a slight ridge to the left (west) of the Utica Road (modern Hwy 18) and 400 yards south of Fourteenmile Creek.
But what types of guns were on the field at Raymond on 12 May 1863? The Confederate guns are listed by historian Edwin C. Bearss as two 12-pound smoothbores and one Whitworth rifle. Whether the Whitworth was a breech-loading or muzzle-loading rifled cannon is unknown, but, it was most probably a 12-pound (2.75 inch) breech-loader.
Union artillery records state the following:
8th Battery, Michigan Light Artillery: two 12-pounder howitzers, four 12- pounder James rifles
Company D, 1st Illinois Light Artillery: four 24-pounder howitzers
3rd Battery, Ohio Light Artillery: four 12-pounder James rifles, two 6-pounderguns11th Battery, Ohio Light Artillery: two 12-pounder howitzers, two 6-pounderguns, two 12-pounder James rifles
While the 12-pound howitzers, 24-pound howitzers, and 6-pound guns are self-explanatory, the 12-pound James rifles are confusing. A true James rifle is a 14-pounder (3.8 inch) with the sleek, unadorned profile of the Ordnance Rifle. However, shortly before and during the Civil War a number of Model 1841 6-pounder bronze barrels were rifled using the James rifling system, devised by General Charles T. James. By rifling the 6-pounder, theoretically the gun could fire an elongated James projectile about double the weight of the 6-pound ball, hence a “James 12-pounder,” more correctly called a “rifled 6-pounder.” Thus, the 12-pounder James rifles of the 8th Michigan Battery, the 3rd Ohio Battery, and the 11th Ohio Battery would actually be Model 1841 6-pounders, albeit rifled to accept a James shell. However, the profile of a Model 1841 6-pound gun is very distinctive with muzzle moldings, a muzzle swell, decorative fillets and astragals, reinforcing rings and ogees, and a breech ring. So, to place a true, sleek, James rifle barrel on the Raymond battlefield would be in error.
Corroboration of the rifled 6-pounders at Raymond recently came from an unexpected source: the reporter-artist Theodore R. Davis, whose sketches appear in this article. A friend, James Drake of Applied Research Associates, Inc., steered this writer to an obscure but illuminating magazine article written by Mr. Davis, entitled “How a Battle is Sketched,” and published in a children’s magazine, St. Nicholas, in July 1889. Davis, an experienced combat artist, could easily identify various caliber cannon, and in his article identified the gun calibers in some of his sketches. A close examination of the cannon in the drawing of DeGolyer’s right flank at Raymond reveals a muzzle swell on the barrel, which, of course, would not have existed on a true James rifle. But, even more revealing is Davis’ statement in his article: “By comparing the note with the drawing, a something may be discovered which stands for one of Captain DeGolyer’s six-pounder cannon.” DeGolyer’s Battery consisted of two 12-pounder howitzers, a gun with a very distinctive barrel (both 12-pound howitzers were emplaced on the left) and four “12-pound James rifles” (which were placed on the right and which were actually four “6-pound rifles”). The very recognizable profile of the barrel of the Model 1841 6-pounder is what Davis saw and sketched in his right flank drawing, and it was irrelevant to him if the gun had been rifled or not-the appearance was that of a 6-pounder and he correctly called it that.
Davis’ sketch was, by his own admission, very hasty due to the fierce combat. He wrote:
My horse had been shot a few moments before the sketch was made, and there is still a reminder of the incident in the form of a scar on my left knee as large as a half-dollar, made by the bullet that killed my horse-or some other bullet. The Raymond fight was not a great battle, but one of those compact and vigorous engagements at close quarters, without any protecting earthworks.
To honor the memory of this vigorous close quarter engagement, Friends of Raymond is working hard to accurately interpret the Raymond battlefield. This interpretation will include the correct placement on the battlefield of cannon by caliber. To assist in this project the Vicksburg National Military Park recently donated some of its old cast iron reproduction cannon carriages to Friends of Raymond. Of course, the irreplaceable original Civil War cannon barrels remained in Vicksburg to be placed on new carriages, but the carriages donated to Friends of Raymond will be carefully restored and the proper caliber reproduction barrels will be obtained-one gun at a time-until Raymond’s battlefield faithfully interprets the artillery action on that fateful day.

Lt. Henry O. Dwight20th Ohio Infantry"The Affair on the Raymond Road"Account published in The New York Semi-Weekly Tribune in 1886
If you want to find fault with anyone for getting up such a fuss on the Raymond Road on that day I may as well tell you at the outset that they [Rebs] began it. All that we wanted was to be let alone.
We had crossed the Mississippi with the rest of General Grant's army, had taken a part in the fight at Port Gibson, had chased the enemy over Bayou Pierre toward Grand Gulf, General Grant riding ahead of everybody sometimes, so anxious was he to come up to the columns that were running away from us. We had reached the Big Black River at Plankinson's [Hankinson's] Ferry and had sat there for several days looking at the Rebels on the other side of the river, taking an occasional pot shot at them when they came too near the bank and getting waked up in the morning occasionally by their shells coming into our camp. We had stayed at Plankinson's until we were tired of it and the Rebs got tired of us, thinking we were going to try to cross. For that matter we thought so too, for all the skiffs in the country were got together and roads were cut to the water at various places.
At last one day we received orders to pack up and march off into the country, leaving the Rebels to watch our old camp for us. We took the Raymond Road, and by looking at the map we all saw that if we kept on long enough we should come out on the railroad between Vicksburg and Jackson, and have the first pick of old Pemberton's supply trains as they came in on the railroad. This march took us away from the Rebels and we were not sorry for that. There was nothing about us that looked like wanting a muss. All we wanted was to go peaceably along the road until we reached the railroad, and then they might do as they liked about it.
The weather was splendid, the roads were in fine condition and there was plenty to eat in the country. It is true that we were more conscientious about taking what we wanted then than we were after we had made the march to the sea. For instance, one day we came to an old woman's house where there was a quantity of honey. It was just a little way from our camp and we thought that a little of the honey would do us good. So, [don't laugh] we undertook to buy the honey. The row of beehives was as tempting to us as a melon patch to a six-foot Negro.
The old woman said she never sold less than a hive. "Well, what will you take for a hive ? " I asked, taking out a roll of bills to show that I meant business. "If you want the honey you can have it for twenty dollars. There's right smart in that there mug," she added pointing to one of the hives. "Twenty dollars!?" I asked aghast. "Yes and I don' t want Yankee greens either" said the old woman with a scornful jerk of her thumb at my roll of bills. "I want money." "What kind of money do you want?" I asked. "I want the real Confederate bills. That there stuff ain't no 'count here." "Oh, you want Confederate money, do you? Well, I can accommodate you," I said, giving her a Confederate fifty-dollar bill for which she gave me thirty dollars in change. Then we went for the honey and had a regular picnic that night.
The next morning, May 12, we went on our way, feeling peaceable to all the world, as I said. Logan's division had the advance and our regiment, the 20th Ohio, led the division, leaving camp about daybreak. In a few minutes we passed the house where we had bought the honey! The old woman was there leaning on the fence smoking her cob pipe and watching the troops go by. When she saw me she said, "Ye'll be back this way before long. They're waiting for you 'uns up yonder." This raised a laugh in the column, for we had seen no Rebs for several days and we knew very well that Pemberton was keeping them all on the other side of the Big Black against we got ready to try a crossing.
The road lay through the woods and fields passing few houses, and what few there were seemed to be as still as a farmhouse in haying time. Sometimes we saw a few little Negros who stood grinning at the men or if the music happened to be playing, they danced to the sound of the fife, for all the world as if they could not help it if they tried. Some times an old Negro woman would appear, bowing and smirking and then when the first embarrassment had worn off lie she would say, "Lord a masay! Be there any more men where you 'uns come from? Peers to me I saw nebber saw so many men since I've been born?" At this time one would be sure to give the regular answer in such cases made and provided…… "Yes, aunty, we come from the place where they make men."
After a while, we were marching quietly along, we heard two gentle pops, which we were able to recognize as gunfire far on in front. "Heh, somebody is shooting squirrels," said one of the boys. 'Pop, pop, pop" came three more shots in quick succession but a little nearer. "The squirrels are shooting back," growled a burly Irishman, "and sure its meself that don't approve of that kind of squirrel shooting - not a bit of it."
A cavalry was in front of us to scout the road for the infantry columns, and it was none of our business if they chose to shoot away their ammunition. But after we had been out two hours or so, while we were halted to take breath a bit, a cavalryman came in from the front and handed a message to General Logan. The General then mounted his horse and rode on out of sight. When we moved on, we soon caught up with him standing by the side of the road and he gave some sort of an order to General Dennis, who was temporarily in command of the brigade. What all the mysterious business of General Logan's was, we could not imagine, but since instantly our regiment was halted and the Colonel ordered it to deploy as skirmishes were on both sides of the road.
Of course we felt solemn when we were ordered to deploy, for it suggested a disagreeable meaning to the shots we had heard. The road lay through the very thickest kind of woods, and you couldn't see a rod so that it took something like a half hour to get the boys all strung out in their places, ready to go on. The line was like three-quarters of a mile long, and you couldn't see more than three men at a time in any part of it. It was enough to make a person swear when the bugles sounded forward and that huge line had to try to keep some sort of an alignment. The trees and underbrush were covered with thorny vines that trailed in tangled chains from branch to branch. Great moss grown trunks of fallen trees had to be climbed over; old stumps, burned out by the fires of ancient hunters, left deep pit falls that a fellow couldn't leap and that had to be circumnavigated, even if the act did bring three or four men into Indian file when they ought to have been scattered out like so many ants. After passing such an obstacle it was always some minutes before the line could find itself again. Sometimes, it could not find itself and a halt had to be sounded when a hundred men or so would be found to have parted from the rest, like an uncoupled freight train, and to be busily scouring the country behind us. Then there would be a great expense of time, breath and strong language. In trying to get the ends of the broken line together.
By the time we had two hours of this kind of work, our solemn feelings, felt on taking the formation that implied nearness of an enemy, had all given place to wrath toward the Calvary scouts who had given such reports as to lead us into this sort of work. If they had really seen any Johnnies, to send our immense line of skirmation into the woods after them was like turning a town meeting into a raspberry patch to catch a chipmunk. Certain it is that we never saw hide nor hair of a Reb all that morning. At last General Logan saw that the main column could not march unless our long skirmish line could be got of its way and he ordered the skirmishers to be brought in. Two companies were then deployed as skirmishes next to the road and the rest of the regiment was made to march in line of battle behind them, ready to support them if need be. We all knew perfectly well that it was only a scare for we had all sifted the country for Rebels as one might sift the dirt for diamonds. However, we could do nothing but grumble, as we pushed on through that terrible undergrowth, until after noon.
By that time we were thoroughly tired out. At last we came to a little clearing of ten or fifteen acres in the woods and for the first time caught sight of our own formation. The cavalry scouts were halted at the further side of the clearing in the shade of the trees and our own skirmishers were halted about on a line with them, fanning themselves in the shade. A staff officer was waiting for us as we came out of the woods with the order to halt in the clearing and to rest for lunch. General Logan was over in the road near the cavalry, dismounted and getting ready for lunch too, first sending he cavalry off on a by road to the left.
It was evident that the scare about rebels, whatever it was, was over, and that we were to march like white men from this on. But we were halted in the open field, in the full blare of the sun. As we stacked arms, Johnnie Stephenson said, "Boys I wish I was in my father's barn." "Why?" asked somebody who wanted the facts in every case. "What would you do then?" He replied, "I'd mightly soon get into the house." This echoed the feelings of the regiment as we baked in that Southern sun. But the General took pity on our condition, and he ordered the skirmish line to be moved forward, a few paces, and up to the edge of the woods where there was a little brook in the shade of the trees. There we stacked arms in luxury and filed our canteens at the brook or poured the cool water over our heated faces. As we lay on the ground at the brook, taking our ease, soldier fashion, the boys were grumbling, chaffing, munching hard tack, or making fires to boil coffee in their tin cups. The other regiments of the brigade came up, an Indiana regiment going into line along the edge of the woods on our right with the 78th Ohio taking the place on our left, with the 68th nearby. DeGolyer's battery of artillery, which always marched with us, stopped in the road near the skirmish line, and two of the guns were pointed down the road, in case any inquisitive chap should be coming from the other direction to see what we were about. Some of our boys sauntered off toward the road to try and find out what the cavalry had seen to put us to all the trouble of marching in line three mortal hours. The whole country was still with the stillness which you only see at nooning after a hard days work in the fields. The grass where we lay was sweet with clover, and a few wild flowers showed their heads here and there. In the woods not very far away a mockingbird was singing. Near where I was an old dead tree had fallen over on to the big arms of one of the neighbors and on one of its decaying branches a real squirrel popped up its head, looking down at us along the brownish streak that marked his usual highway to the ground.
"Bang cr-r-r-r-r-r-a-n-g! Bang Cr-r-r-r-r-ang!" came two shells from the peaceable country in front bursting over the heads of the groups in the road. There was a running to and fro and almost immediately DeGolyer replied with his two guns in this sudden challenge of the enemy whose existence we had just been disputing. We all jumped, of course, every man feeling as he hadn't felt since the last time he was caught stealing apples. But we hadn't time to more than turn our heads when from out of the quiet woods on the other side of the brook, there came a great yell, of thousands of voices, followed by a crashing roar of musketry as one doesn't very often hear unless he has been prepared for it.
"Attention, battalion, take arms, forward march," shouted Colonel Force and we all blessed him for knowing exactly what to do, and for doing it. The boys seized their guns - some were barefoot, for they were washing their feet in the brook; some had the coffee in their hands which the scare had made them clutch from the fire, and some twenty or thirty were dead or wounded from that first volley. But, quick as though all who could stand took their guns and had plunged through the woods. On the other side, not fifty yards distance, the enemy were crashing through the underbrush in a magnificent line determined to carry all before them.
Two brigades of Texas troops had been watching our movements all the morning and when we stopped for our nooning, their pickets were not a hundred yards from our skirimsh line. The moving of our main line to the edge of the woods without sending skirmishers on in front had given them their chance for a surprise. Three regiments had come quickly to the thicket in front of me, got all ready, and made their rush with seven or eight other regiments backing them up.On our side our own brigade happened to be in line but was not expecting any such unprovoked assault. What cavalry we had had been sent off to the left to take a look at things toward the Big Black where after all the chief danger seemed to be. DeGolyer's battery was watering its horses so near to the skirmish line that if the infantry was driven back an inch, it would be captured by the swarming rebels long before help could be got from our other brigades, for the other two brigades of our division were scattered along the road, just where they happened to be when they received the order to half for lunch.
At the first rush the Rebel line far outflanked the Indiana regiment on our right and the whole regiment broke into inch bits, the boys making good time to the rear. This left the Johnnies, a clear road to pass our flank, and they made good use of their chance, working well to our rear before long and putting bullets into the reverse of our line the best they knew how. At this moment, the fate of the brigade, and certainly of our battery down there in the road, depended on the possibility of our holding these fellows at bay until the other brigades could be brought up.
When we rushed through the brook we found the enemy upon us but we found also that the bank of the brook sloped off a bit, with a kind of beach at its further edge which made a first rate shelter. So we dropped on the ground right there and gave those Texans all the bullets we could cram into our Enfields until our guns were hot enough to sizzle. The gray line paused, staggering back like a ship in collision which trembles in every timber from the shock. Then they too gave us volley after volley, always working up toward us breathing our fire until they had come within twenty or even fifteen paces. In one part of the line some of them came nearer than that and had to be poked back with the bayonets.
It was the 7th Texas which had struck us, a regiment which had never been beaten in any fight. We soon found that they didn't scare worth a cent. They kept trying to pass through our fire, jumping up, pushing forward a step, and then falling back into the same place, just as you may see a lot of dead leaves in a gale of wind, eddying to and fro under a bank, often rising up as if to flyaway, but never able to advance a peg. It was a question of life or death with us to hold them, for we knew very well that we would go to Libby, those that were left of us -if we could not stand against the scorching fire which beat into our faces in that first hour.
Meanwhile, the Johnnies sent in another regiment on our left to pick up Degolyer's battery, as a kind of a past time like. But the battery had given back a little for the sake of a better ground and when the Johnnies tried to go there they got the fire of the 78th and 68th besides as much canister as they could digest for one while. So, they concluded that they would not take DeGolyer just then. General Logan sent all his aids on a run down the road for the other brigades of the division, while he made a rush for the Indiana regiment which was falling back from our right, and got the boys to face about and take position where they could pepper the Rebs who were firing into our flank and rear. General Logan knew that he had the whole corps behind him and General McPherson was already on hand -sending back to Crocker to hurry up his division -but he knew that this sort of thing [the pulling often Rebel regiments on to three or four of his regiments] could not go on very long. So the other brigades seem to him a terribly long time in getting up.
In the midst of all the anxiety one of the staff came up to General Logan from one of the wished for brigades and said, "General ______ will be here before very long. He says that he will start as soon as his men have finished their coffee."Even in the hurry of the rough time, this answer made General Logan stop and stare. His feelings were too deep for proper uterance. He only said, "Go tell General _____that he isn't worth h----room," and rode off to place the regiment of the First Brigade, which now began to come up. The staff officer mounted his horse and galloped down the road. He is said to have given General Logan's message word for word. I am sorry to say that I have not the papers to prove this statement, but it was believed by all the boys at the time, and if it was not true it ought to be.
All this time we were hanging on to the bank of the brook with those fellows pouring gun smoke in our faces and we answering back so fast that the worst game of football is nothing to the fatigue of it. As for the noise of that discussion between the 20th Ohio and the 7th Texas, a clap of thunder is nowhere. It was more like a sheet of thunder, a wicked roar with no separation between the bolts, and all the time the Johnnies made it hot for us in flank and rear as well as in front.
The Johnnies seemed rather to like it. We could see them tumble over pretty often, but those who were left didn't mid it. One officer, not more than thirty feet from where I stood quietly loaded up an old meerschaum [pipe] and lit a match. His pistol was hanging from his wrist. When he got his pipe agoing, he got hold of his pistol and went on popping away at us as leisurely as if he had been shooting rats. Why that fellow didn't get shot I don't know. The fact is when you start to draw a bead on any chap in such a fight, you have to make up your mind mighty quick whom you'll shoot. There are so many on the other side that look that look as if they were just getting a bead on you that it takes a lot of nerve to stick to the one that you first wanted to attend to. You generally feel like trying to kind of distribute your bullets so as to take in all who ought to be hit. So a good many get off who are near enough to be knocked over the first time. We could not understand why somebody wasn't sent out to cover our flank in place of the Indiana fellows. It seemed as if we were forgotten. So when they sent us some ammunition it was like a gift from distant friends and did us good like a reinforcement. It was quite as well that we did not know that the first of our two rear brigades had come up and had deployed on the right of the rallied Indianians, but even then Logan found himself outnumbered two to one. The fellows on the right kept the Rebs from scooping us up; but could not get forward enough to cover our flank and had to fight like everything to hold their own. So we were left sticking out like a sore finger for the best part of another hour. There were only nine companies of us and out of those about the number of one company had been killed or wounded. Two companies, A and I were out on the skirmish line when those chaps rose up and charged. Hao Wilson of Company I managed to assemble his men from between the two lines of fire and brought them in. Birt Weathersby of Company A was not so fortunate. The length of the line of skirmishes had taken him well to the right so that when the affair commenced he was cut off from us by the Rebs who got on our flank. He and his men were left in the air like Noah's dove, without rest for the soles of their feet until they managed to join the 81st Illinois in the brigade that went in on that flank and fought as a part of that brigade for the rest of the battle. But their fighting there did not alter the fact of there being but nine companies of us in that thicket, exchanging our hot lead for Texas hot lead as fast as either side could put it in; and becoming fewer and fewer all the time as the numbers lying in the pool of blood became more and more.
The brook bank protected us some. The leaves and twigs moved away from the bushes by the Texan bullets fell softly along us; but those fellows shot to hit and not to cut twigs about or ears. Captain Kega got his collar bone and shoulder blade splintered and badly mixed. Johnny Stevenson wanted to be in his father's barn more than ever when a half inch of lead had ploughed a hole through his neck. One of the sergeants shouted to me as I stood beside him but I could not hear. He was loading his gun and he roared again in my ear, "They've got me this time, I'm sure going to have one more pop at them." He took careful aim and fired, and fell backward into the brook, with a bright red hole in his shoulder. Then, I understood what he meant. Company C kept its officers and was commanded at last by a high private named Canavan who managed things like a West Pointer. Most of the men killed were shot through the head and never knew what hurt them.
Well, the short of it is that it was a pretty tough time that we had of it, lying there by the brook and digging our toes into the ground for fear that the mass of men in front would push us back over the bank after all. But every man held to his place, for every one felt as if there was a precipice behind and he would go down a thousand feet if he let go his hold on that bank.
At last the rear brigade of our division got up and Logan sent them in on the right where the Johnnies were again ready to make a flanking rush. Our fresh brigade went in with will and effects. They didn't wait for much ceremony but just felt their front with a few short volleys to kind of get the temper of the chaps, and then they charged like men who had their coffee. We heard their cheer but we didn't hear the angry burst of musketry with which the Rebs replied to it, not the noises made by our other brigade as it came up on to the line with us.
Pretty soon we found the Rebs in front of us were edging off a bit. Somehow we were not pressed so hard. The firing kept up, but the smoke did not puff into our mouths so much. More twigs and leaves were hit and fewer men. Then, we began to hear the bullets for the first time. The Johnnies were farther away. Then there was nobody left to shoot and our own fire stopped. Now, we could stand up and stretch our legs and rinse the charcoal and saltpeter out of our mouths in the muddy brook. I looked at my watch. We had been at work on those Texans near two hours and a half although I must say that after it was over it did not seem more than an hour.
We were a hardlooking lot. The smoke had blackened our faces, our lips and our throats so far down that it took a week to get the last of it out. The most dandified officer in the regiment looked like a coalheaver.
But there was no time to be thinking about looks. "Attention, battalion, forward march," came the order of Colonel Force again and away we went with a shout over the ghastly pile of Texans who had been laid along their line beyond the woods and the first thing I saw on the ground was the meerschaum which the Rebel officer had smoked during the fight. It was still warm as it lay where it had dropped from his mouth when he ran and I picked it up and took my turn at smoking it. In front of us was a bare ridge, and over this the Rebels were retiring in a bulging and shaky line; pelted by DeGolyer's best shrapnel and pelted by the rifle fire of our Third Brigade boys. The affair on the Raymond Road was over.
There was a dinner in the town hall at Raymond which the ladies of the town had got ready to refresh the Johnnies on their return from the fight. But the Johnnies hadn't time to indulge at the time of their return. In fact, they had gone a good distance beyond the town without stopping before the good people of Raymond understood the strategic move which was in progress. The dinner was quite as useful to the Yankees who had time to eat it as it would have been to the Rebs.
The next day, we had the railroad which supplied Vicksburg and the day after, the 14th, met our Texas friends again when we went to back up Crocker's division in the grand rush which sent them ad the rest of Joe Johnson's army flying through Jackson. Then, we turned toward Vicksburg and on the 16th, beat poor old Pemberton at Champion's Hills, coming in on the right of Hovey, who had the heaviest part of that fight.
But, it was a long time before we got into a place so hot as the thicket in front of Raymond where we fought for the bank of the brook.
One Year Regiment
27 September 1862 ~ 8 December 1863
RAYMOND. . . The Vicksburg Campaign has been called the most brilliant campaign ever fought on American soil by the United States Army in its "how to fight" manual. Yet, this series of military operations is often overlooked; it has been left in the shadows of famous Civil War battles such as Antietam and Gettysburg. Consequently, the battles of Major General Ulysses S. Grant's masterful offensive campaign are obscure and often misunderstood in their role as decisive moments in history. Not to be forgotten is the Battle of Raymond, Mississippi.

After months of futile attempts to capture Vicksburg, Grant moved his army south of the city in the spring of 1863. Trudging through the Louisiana swamplands west of the river, the federals made use of numerous ruses and raids. One of these is Grierson's famed cavalry jaunt through Mississippi; this monumental march went virtually unnoticed by the Confederate army commander, Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton. Then with the help of the Union Navy, infantry was cleverly transported, unopposed, across the murky Mississippi. From here, they climbed the 200-foot bluffs on the Mississippi side of the river, and tramped inland on April 30. The next day, Grant's army defeated a much smaller makeshift Confederate force just west of Port Gibson, Mississippi, thus securing a strong foothold in Mississippi. Union Soldiers were just 26 miles south of Vicksburg.

Pemberton's forces fell back towards Vicksburg in anticipation of an attack on the southern edge of the city. Grant however, maintained the element of surprise by marching his army northeastward. USing the Big Black River to protect his left flank, his preliminary target was the Southern Railroad of Mississippi. This railroad connected Vicksburg to Jackson, the state's capital, and from Jackson to other points in all directions. Grant's plan was deceptively simple: cut Pemberton off before destroying him.

On the evening of May 11, Grant's forces were preparing to move to an east-west line that ran parallel to the railroad, and just a few miles south of it. Major General John A. McClernand's soldiers of the 13th Corps were about 15 miles west of Raymond, and Major General William T. Sherman's 15th Corps was on McClernand's right, about 11 miles west of Raymond. Major General James B. McPherson's 17th Corps was scheduled to complete the line by forming on Sherman's right at Raymond, but the setting sun found McPherson's men about nine miles southwest of Raymond on the Utica Road. The insufferably hot, dry weather and accompanying lack of water along McPherson's route had hindered the young general's rate of march.

Grant established his headquarters with McClernand at the hamlet of Cayuga on May 11th, and dashed off a message to the lagging McPherson, who was camped at the Roach farm on the Utica Road. Grant directed McPherson to move his corps as quickly as possible to Raymond. Simultaneously, McClernand and Sherman were to move to the north and east to form the left and middle segment of a line roughly six miles south of, and parallel to, the railroad. McPherson, once he arrived at Raymond, would anchor the right of this line.

Raymond, incorporated in 1829, is a scenic Southern town, shaded by towering oaks among the rolling green hills of central Mississippi. In the spring of 1863 the idyllic setting was shattered by the approach of two belligerent armies. On May 11th, McPherson's 12,000 thirsty soldiers were trudging towards Raymond from their camp at Weeks' farm, four miles past Utica along the Utica-Raymond Road. The federals marched only one and one-half miles on the 11th, encamping at Roach's farm on the road to Raymond. Roach's was only one-half mile from the waters of Tallahala Creek, and the parched soldiers needed water. On the same day, Brigadier General John Gregg's brigade of 3,000 Confederates marched into Raymond around 4:00 P.M. Confederate Sergeant Sumner Cunningham of the 41st Tennessee recalled that his regiment, upon arriving in Raymond, spent the night of May 11th in the courthouse yard, sleeping on a "fine coat of grass."

McPherson's 12,000 men were rousted out of their sleep at Roach's farm at 3:30 A.M. on the morning of May 12th so that they could arrive in Raymond per Grant's order. As they were trudging through the dust to Raymond, General Gregg was making a fateful decision for his much smaller force of 3,000. Confederate mounted militia had trotted headlong into General McPherson's 160-man provisional cavalry battalion in the pre-dawn hours of May 12th. The Union troopers traded shots, and drove the rebels back towards Raymond. This effectively screened the size of McPherson's approaching column. Hall's men galloped in a cloud of dust into Raymond, and reported to General Gregg.

Gregg's scouts had only seen the lead brigade of McPherson's column comprised of two Union divisions; this contributed to the gross underestimate. The combative Gregg was not about to fall back, especially if he thought he was facing only a Union brigade. Ironically, he decided to set a trap for this "marauding excursion." He would lure the enemy forward on the Utica Road by placing a regiment in a blocking position where Fourteenmile Creek flowed under a wooden bridge about two miles south of Raymond. The remainder of Gregg's men would be placed in positions to support the advanced regiment; they would spring the trap, and to ensure that no other Union forces were approaching on different roads. Two regiments were placed on the lower Gallatin Road, which ran almost parallel to the Utica Road and about one mile to the east. These two Tennessee regiments, at the appropriate time, were to swing westward to hit the Union right flank as the federals attacked the blocking position at the bridge on the Utica Road. Gregg intended to bag the perceived Union brigade.

The trap was now set. It seemed like a dream--a large Confederate brigade of about 3,000 Soldiers attacking a smaller Union brigade of about 1,500 men. However, it was a formula for an impending Confederate defeat when poor intelligence failed to identify the Union force as over 12,000 soldiers with 22 cannon.

While Gregg pondered his troop dispositions, the Union infantry scuffled through the powdery Mississippi dust toward Raymond. Because of the billowing dust caused by thousands of feet and hundreds of wheels and hooves, the interval between regiments lengthened, with soldiers using bandannas as masks against the suffocating cloud. At the head of the miles long column was the 20th Ohio Infantry Regiment, which was part of Major General John Logan's division. Ohio Sergeant Osborne Oldroyd noted in his diary, "May 12th, roused up early and before daylight marched, the 20th Ohio in the lead. Now we have the honored position, and will probably get the first taste of battle." Oldroyd did not record that the "honored position" also meant that his regiment stirred, rather than swallowed, the stifling dust. Confederate shells now shrieked overhead; the time was 10:00 A.M. and the Battle of Raymond had begun.
Generals McPherson and Logan were sizing up the situation when the six cannon of Captain Samuel DeGolyer's 8th Michigan Light Artillery Battery stopped up the Utica Road behind their lathering teams. They placed their guns into battery on the left and right of the Utica Road, on a slight ridge about 400 yards south of the Fourteenmile Creek bridge. According to Sergeant Oldroyd, posted nearby with the 20th Ohio,
“The battle to-day opened very suddenly, and when DeGolier's [sp.] battery began to thunder, while the infantry fire was like the pattering of a shower, some cooks, happening to be surprised near the front, broke for the rear carrying their utensils. One of them with a kettle in his hand, rushing at the top of his speed, met General Logan, who piteously cried, 'Oh General, I've got no gun, and such a snapping and cracking as there is up yonder I never heard before.' The General let him pass to the rear.”
Expecting nothing but cavalry, the Confederates felt satisfied with early events and sent skirmishers forward. Suddenly, the sound of the rebel skirmishers rifle’s were lost amid the roar of musketry, and the thunder of a six-gun battery.

As General Gregg had ordered, the 7th Texas Infantry Regiment attacked across Fourteenmile Creek, with Colonel Hiram Granbury anchoring his regiment's right on the Utica Road and its left on the 3rd Tennessee Infantry. The 3rd Tennessee was a 500-man regiment brought forward to the creek to assist the Texans and to further bait the trap. It also supported the 41st Tennessee, which was brought forward from its reserve position in the town square. The Texans' attack was to be taken up by the 3rd Tennessee in a right to left movement.

At the first the Rebel line far outflanked the 23rd Indiana, and the whole regiment broke into inch bits, the Soldiers making good time to the rear. As the Confederate attack rolled right to left, the 3rd Tennessee charged in support on the Texan's left flank. The 3rd Tennessee went with the rebel yell, driving the enemy back through a cornfield and across a deep narrow creek. From here they were ordered to lie down and continue to fight at this position.

Despite the four-to-one Union odds, the Confederates obtained initial success due to the Union officers' difficulty in maneuvering their regiments into line from the corps-long column that snaked its way along the road from Utica. Several Union regiments dropped to the ground and gave the Texans all the bullets they could cram into their muskets. The gray line paused, and staggered back. Then, the rebels gave volley for volley, always working up toward the federals until they had come within twenty paces of each other. In one part of the line some of them came nearer than that, and were forced back at the point of a bayonet. The 7th Texas had never been beaten in any fight up to that point.

During that critical first hour of the battle, the 20th Ohio was being flanked on its right. Every man knew it would be sure death to retreat; all they had behind them was a bank seven feet high, made slippery by the wading and climbing back of the wounded. The 7th Texas fought desperately, and no doubt they fully expected to defeat the regiment early in the fight, before they could get reinforcements. The regiment on their right was giving way but just as the line was wavering and about to be hopelessly broken General Logan dashed up and with the shriek of an eagle, and turned them back to their places which they regained and held. General Logan's stand had bought the time needed for additional Union regiments to rush into line, and the tide of battle began to turn.

Meanwhile, to the east on the Gallatin Road, the two Tennessee regiments that were to be the swinging arm of Gregg's trap moved cautiously westward as ordered. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Beaumont's 50th Tennessee, the next regiment in line for the right to left attack, moved across Fourteeenmile Creek and through the belt of timber bordering the deep creek bed. Because the creek turns southeast as it approaches the Gallatin Road, Beaumont emerged from the timber south of the fighting, which was raging off first to his right, and now, his men were behind the Union right flank. From this vantage point, the bewildered officer saw a Union brigade in battle line two hundred yards to his front right, with more regiments filing into line, and at least a brigade on the ridge to his front left. Beaumont realized that the brigade he was supposed to be attacking was at least a division, and he aborted his attack. The 10th and 30th Tennessee (consolidated), which was to take up the attack upon the commitment of Beaumont's soldiers, waited for an advance that was not to come. This allowed the full fury of the massing Union regiments to fall upon the Texans and Tennesseans along the creek near the Utica Road.

The battle was now fierce. Almost hand to hand, so close that some of the Union Soldiers fixed their bayonets. Both lines stood equally firm, equally determined as a couple of bull dogs engaged in a death struggle. The air was full of whizzing bullets, and they cut up the ground and made the dust fly. In the smoke and dust the situation became even more confused, and General Gregg lost command and control of his scattered brigade. The Confederate regiments simply marched to the sound of the firing as a thick fog enveloped the battlefield. Colonel Randall McGavock of the 10th and 30th Tennessee counter-marched his soldiers from the Gallatin Road, and then westward to the thickest of the fighting. Rushing his men to shore up the evaporating Confederate left flank, the Harvard Law School graduate and former mayor of Nashville, Tennessee, was shot dead leading a counterattack into the Union onslaught. Ironically, the 10th and 30th Tennessee was a Confederate Irish regiment, and Colonel McGavock's last charge was into the face of a Union Irish regiment, the 7th Missouri Infantry.

Eventually, General Logan had moved his entire Third Division of McPherson's 17th Corps into line of battle, and by 1:30 P.M., Brigadier General Marcellus Crocker's 7th Division began to stream onto the contested ground. Simply stated however, there was not enough space and not enough enemy for two divisions to be properly employed. Gregg's command was now grossly outnumbered and his right wing was being driven back despite being reinforced by his left wing regiments. By mid afternoon, Gregg's lone brigade was in dire straits.

In such situations, events usually go from bad to worse. General Gregg experienced this when one of his three cannon, a relatively rare English Whitworth breech-loading rifle, burst at the muzzle. Gregg soon realized that he had grossly underestimated the size of the Union force, and by 4:00 P.M. ordered his commanders to retire from the field. The Confederate retreat was greeted by the cheers of the Union Soldiers at the crossing of the creek.

The Confederate view of the retreat was despondent. The 3rd Tennessee had fired all their ammunition and a fresh column was advancing directly upon them. No support appeared at their rear or left and they had been terribly mauled; they were soon scattered into the thick woods and their colonel ordered a retreat. The order was barely in time; before the left wing could fall back the federals succeeded in capturing some of rebels, all of whom were exhausted. On their was to the rear, they were severely galled by the enemy on both flanks. The whole force then fell back to Raymond and immediately commenced their retreat.

The official, but still disputed, casualty count for the Battle of Raymond is small compared to battles such as Shiloh, Antietam, or Gettysburg; the fight at Raymond cost Gregg 73 killed, 252 wounded, and 190 missing, most of whom were from the 3rd Tennessee and the 7th Texas. McPherson's losses totaled 446 of whom 68 were killed, 341 wounded, and 37 missing.

The Confederate dead now lie in the Raymond City Cemetery after the citizens of Raymond moved them from their battlefield graves to the western edge of the town graveyard. After the war, the Union dead were disinterred from their resting places on Raymond's battleground and re-interred in the Vicksburg National Military Cemetery, 30 miles to the west and the site of their ultimate objective.

The casualty figures belie the significance of the Battle of Raymond, which is the effect this fight had on the Vicksburg Campaign. At sundown on May 12th, 1863, the victorious men of McPherson's 17th Corps were policing the battlefield. The wounded of both sides were fighting for their lives in the churches, homes, courthouse, and hotel of Raymond.

Major General Grant was establishing his army headquarters at Colonel Dillon's farm, seven miles west of Raymond on the Port Gibson Road. An excited courier rode in from Raymond to advise Grant of McPherson's victory. Grant learned that Gregg's defeated Confederates were falling back to Jackson, and his excellent intelligence reports told him that General Joseph E. Johnston and additional troops were enroute to Jackson. Grant knew that General Pemberton and a portion of the Confederate army was presently in the vicinity of Edwards, Mississippi, which was the focal point of Grant's movement on the Southern Railroad. Grant realized that Johnston would be assembling a sizeable force at Jackson. If he continued his planned move of all three Union corps to hit the railroad, he would find himself with enemy to his left front at Edwards, and to his right at Jackson.

Therefore, if he continued his present course of action, his right flank would be open to attack by Johnston. If he turned his army toward Jackson, Pemberton could strike his rear. A more cautious commander would have pulled back. Instead, Grant boldly cancelled his previous movement orders toward the railroad, and at Dillon's on the night of May 12th, he ordered his army toward Jackson and Joe Johnston. After all, he had stolen a march on Pemberton when he moved south on the Louisiana side of the Mississippi River, then across the river into Mississippi. He had again fooled Pemberton by not marching north from Port Gibson to Vicksburg, instead turning to the northeast toward the railroad at Edwards. Now he would fool Pemberton by moving to Jackson, instead of to Edwards.

Grant maneuvered his three corps into position on May 13th, and on May 14th he attacked and captured Jackson. He drove Johnston's men out of the capital city, and virtually destroyed the town and the railroads there. While Johnston retreated 30 miles north to Canton, Grant turned westward and attacked the unwary Pemberton at Champion Hill on May 16th, driving him back to Vicksburg. He defeated Pemberton's weak blocking force at Big Black River Bridge on May 17th, and bottled Pemberton in the city on May 18th and 19th. After 47 days of siege operations, Grant captured Vicksburg. Just as importantly, he captured Pemberton's Army of Vicksburg. Grant understood that it was necessary to first capture the enemy forces, then the enemy territory.

The Battle of Raymond looms large in history. The change in the operational situation after Raymond resulted in a change of Grant's scheme of maneuver in the Vicksburg Campaign. He boldly changed his decisive point from the Southern Railroad near Edwards to the capital city of Jackson. He made an audacious decision to attack one force at Jackson while turning his back on another at Edwards. As soon as Jackson fell, he resumed the offensive by attacking and defeating Pemberton at Champion Hill, Big Black River, and Vicksburg. The Battle of Raymond stands as a pivotal point in the most brilliant campaign ever fought on American soil.

Note: There was only one house burned in Raymond. The house that was burned was on the site of the Kelly Williams’ home on Main Street. According to witnesses, Ms. Williams went to one of the Union hospitals. While there, this lady saw a Union soldier dying on a pillow confiscated from her house. She jerked the pillow from under his head and remarked, ‘No damned Yankee is going to die on my pillow.' The officer in charge of the hospital replied, 'Madam, you’ll regret this,” and that night her house was burned.
Civil War Harper's Weekly, June 13, 1863

DEGOYER’S BATTERY OPENS THE BATTLE OF RAYMOND MISSISSIPPI
SKETCHED BY MR. THEODORE R. DAVIS
DEGOYERS’ BATTERY SHELLING THE REBEL REAR BATTLE OF RAYMOND MISSISSIPPI

VOL. VII.-No. 337.]
NEW YORK, SATURDAY, JUNE 13, 1863.
SINGLE COPIES SIX CENTS.
$3,00 PER YEAR IN ADVANCE.
Entered according to Act of Congress, in the Year 1863, by Harper & Brothers, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court for the Southern District of New York.
THE ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE.
THE BATTLE OF RAYMOND.
"HEAD-QUARTERS MAJOR-GENERAL McPHERSON MAY 13, 1863
"At 10 o'clock on the 12th the 'Body Guard,' under Captain Foster, discovered the enemy in small force upon the road three miles from Raymond. A portion of General Dennis's brigade-the Twentieth Ohio and Thirtieth Illinois Regiments -were deployed to the right and left of the road. Being advanced, the enemy were discovered in line of battle, occupying a commanding position, a mile and a half from Raymond.
" A section of De Golyer's battery was placed in position in the road, and at a distance of one thousand yards opened the fight, when the whole battery was placed in position, with the brigade of General Dennis for its support, it being in turn supported by the brigades of Generals Smith and Stevenson, who soon after formed in line (Previous Page al Logan's division, were soon charged by the enemy. The charge was upon the right flank, but the previous disposition of troops frustrated it, and a sharp engagement of an hour ensued. The enemy were repulsed.
"General Crocker's division coming up, was disposed to the right, left, and reserve by General McPherson , and the line immediately advanced. The rebels, being driven from their position, retreated through the town toward Jackson. and our troops occupied Raymond. Our loss was 52 killed and 198 wounded. Among the killed was Colonel Richards. Colonel McCook was wounded."

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